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1 Introduction 
The European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is a ma-
jor industrial project that aims at replacing the many different national 
train control and command systems in Europe with a standardised sys-
tem. In Great Britain, Network Rail are preparing to introduce ERTMS 
as part of the upgrade of the signalling and communications systems 
running on Britain’s rail infrastructure. This upgrade has the potential 
to increase the risk of an electronic attack on the rail infrastructure, as it 
brings more systems under centralised control. Government and rail-
way stakeholders identified a need to understand the security implica-
tions of the new technology more than five years ago and there have 
been a number of studies by industry specialists and government agen-
cies of the impact that cyber issues might have on the safety and resil-
ience of railway systems.  
This paper presents some of the work done by Adelard in this area, 
ranging from an analysis of potential vulnerabilities in the ERTMS 
specifications [1] through to a high-level cyber security risk assessment 
of a national ERTMS implementation and detailed analysis of particu-
lar ERTMS systems on behalf of the GB rail industry. The focus of the 
paper is on our overall methodology for security-informed safety and 
hazard analysis. Lessons learned will be presented but of course our 
detailed results remain proprietary or sensitive and cannot be published. 
2 Railway security requirements 
Traditionally, computer security deals with threats to confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability, but here we are concerned with train move-
ments rather than information, so our primary concern is integrity, then 
availability, and finally confidentiality. Loss of integrity could result in 
accidents or collisions, whereas loss of availability would bring the 
railway system to a halt. Loss of confidentiality is less of an immediate 
threat, but might result in the leak of sensitive operational information. 
Reliability is also important, since an unreliable train service will result 
in a loss of public confidence in the railway operators.  
Thus, the hazards or potential failures or undesirable outcomes to be 
avoided are: 
• a collision involving multiple trains; 
• an accident such as derailment involving a single train; 
• widespread disruption of train service over a large area; 
• disruption to individual trains, or trains within a local area; 
• creation of a situation that leads to panic and potential loss of life   
(e.g., an emergency stop and uncontrolled evacuation onto the track); 
• creation of a situation that leads to passenger discomfort and dissatis-
faction,   
(e.g., stopping a train indefinitely in a tunnel); 
• loss of public confidence in the railway system due to intermittent 
low-level  
problems affecting the reliability of the service; 
• leak of sensitive information (e.g., movements of hazardous cargoes 
or VIPs). 
The ERTMS safety analysis considers the effect of potentially catastro-
phic events on the integrity of the system. Faults that could result in an 
accident need to be considered in both a safety and security analysis, 
regardless of the underlying cause of the fault (accidental, deliberate or 
malicious). 
3 Security analysis of ERTMS specifications 
The starting point for our ERTMS work was a security analysis of the 
ERTMS specifications that we were commissioned to perform on be-
half of key UK railway stakeholders and UK government about five 
years ago. The aim of the study was to examine the ERTMS specifica-
tions for potential security vulnerabilities and identify systemic weak-
nesses in the ERTMS specifications. We were concerned with concep-
tual problems with the specifications rather than vulnerabilities intro-
duced by design flaws, bugs in implementations of ERTMS technology 
or vulnerabilities that might be caused during the operation or mainte-
nance of an ERTMS system. Such vulnerabilities are important but 
were outside the scope of our study.  
Our analysis was holistic and considered whether a national deploy-
ment of ERTMS might introduce vulnerabilities into the national rail 
infrastructure. Our review focused on ERTMS Application Level 2, 
which made it possible to restrict attention to a number of core specifi-
cations, and ignore specifications for interacting with legacy train pro-
tection systems and trackside signalling equipment. We also considered 
the security of GSM-R and analysed how GSM security impacts on 
GSM-R security. We were particularly interested in electronic attacks 
that could be launched remotely and would cause widespread disrup-
tion.  
3.1 Methodology 
Our approach was to consider the trust relationships between the vari-
ous components of the overall architecture and analyse the consequence 
of a breach of trust. This enabled us to identify a set of potential weak-
nesses and vulnerabilities in the specifications. We then developed sce-
narios that showed how these weaknesses could be exploited by an at-
tacker. These scenarios were refined and validated in discussion with 
railway stakeholders, and proved to be a very effective way of commu-
nicating the risks of an ERTMS implementation being compromised.  
Analysis of trust relationships. ERTMS is implemented using a num-
ber of trackside and on-board sub-systems, and the ERTMS/ETCS 
specifications describe the interfaces by which these various subsys-
tems interact to ensure that trains move safely without exceeding their 
movement authority. We performed a systematic analysis of the 
ERTMS/ETCS specifications from a security perspective by examining 
the on-board ETCS application, and considering its interfaces and trust 
relationships with other components of the ERTMS/ETCS system, both 
trackside and on-board the train.  
Development of attack scenarios. Having identified some potential 
vulnerabilities in the ERTMS specifications, we devised attack scenar-
ios to explore the ways in which an attacker could exploit these poten-
tial weaknesses and vulnerabilities to achieve one of the undesirable 
outcomes identified in Section 2.  
We devised seven attack scenarios and then analysed each scenario in 
detail by considering the following questions:  
• How is the attack performed? 
• What vulnerabilities does the attack exploit? 
• Where can the attack be launched from? 
• What are the possible mitigations? 
We then graded each attack according to a range of criteria: 
• The type of access required to exploit a vulnerability 
• The level of technical sophistication required to exploit a vulner-
ability 
• The type of failure caused by a successful attack 
• The scale of effect for a successful attack 
• The scalability of the attack from the attacker’s perspective 
• The type of impact caused by a successful attack 
• The types of mitigation strategy that are possible 
• The level of difficulty for implementing each mitigation 
We did not attempt to rank the various attack scenarios using a 
weighted average of the category scores because we believe that such a 
ranking would be too simplistic – the relative weighting of the various 
categories and the ranking of the scenarios is a matter for government 
and industry stakeholders. Similarly, we did not attempt to estimate the 
likelihood of attacks being successful because this would depend on the 
national implementation of ERTMS and is therefore best left to the 
domain experts. Instead, we used colour coding (HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) 
to highlight the issues. Using this colour coding, we produced a table 
summarising our grading of each attack scenario under the various 
headings to enable the scenarios to be easily compared.  
Broadly speaking, attacks that can be launched remotely do not require 
a high level of sophistication and are highly scalable – however, such 
attacks are relatively easy to mitigate. Conversely, attacks that require 
local access are less scalable but also more difficult to mitigate. Hence 
important trade-offs need to be made by the relevant decision makers 
and risk managers. The advantage of the analysis and grading approach 
presented here is that it identifies these trade-offs and helps decision 
makers to make more informed decisions. 
4 Risk assessment of a national implementation of ERTMS 
Following on from our initial security analysis of the ERTMS specifi-
cation, we were asked to provide a risk assessment for a national im-
plementation of ERTMS.  
In Great Britain, Network Rail are planning to implement an ERTMS 
overlay on top of the existing signalling and control system [2]. There 
are also plans to introduce a new traffic management system and elimi-
nate the need for about 800 small signal boxes by centralising traffic 
management into a small number of regional control centres. This cen-
tralisation will require a more network-oriented architecture with re-
mote access to local (normally unmanned) equipment rooms via Net-
work Rail’s fixed telecommunications network (FTN). The infrastruc-
ture is expected to evolve over time, with more equipment being cen-
tralised and the core FTN being updated to use IP-based protocols 
rather than dedicated voice and data channels. 
Adelard were asked to determine on behalf of Government whether 
these changes represented a high-level risk to the national infrastruc-
ture. At this stage in the upgrade programme, the exact details of the 
planned infrastructure changes have not yet been defined, so we pro-
vided a high level assessment of the cyber security risks associated with 
a generic ERTMS-based railway infrastructure. 
4.1 Approach 
The risk assessment methodology that we followed is described briefly 
below.  
The first step was to establish the system context and agree on the 
scope and motivation for the assessment with stakeholders. The major 
system assets and services were identified in order to ensure that the 
risk assessment was focused on high impact scenarios. Potential threat 
sources were identified and attack capabilities and impact levels were 
defined. 
The next step was to perform a preliminary risk analysis, identifying 
potential hazards and consequences, and relevant vulnerabilities and 
causes together with any intrinsic mitigations and controls. This analy-
sis was then refined to identify specific attack scenarios, which were 
prioritised according to the capabilities required and the potential con-
sequences of the attack. 
The final step was to summarise the results of the risk analysis, identify 
areas of uncertainty, possible mitigations and controls, and present the 
results of the risk assessment in the following terms: 
• a set of potential attacks on an ERTMS-based system 
• the capabilities needed to implement these attacks 
• the worst case impact of each attack 
In order to quantify the actual risk, it would be necessary to combine 
these results with an intelligence assessment of the likelihood of a par-
ticular threat source having the necessary capabilities to perform each 
attack. 
4.2 System context 
ERTMS is designed to be an overlay on an existing signalling infra-
structure so it is necessary to consider the underlying railway system as 
part of any implementation of ERTMS. Following discussions with 
Network Rail, we modeled the railway system as a series of layers. 
Table 1summarises the functionality provided by each layer and the 
required safety integrity level (SIL). 
Layer Safety Integrity 
Level 
Functionality 
Business SIL0 Timetable,  
Train Information,  
Operations and Maintenance 
Control SIL2 Traffic management,  
Automatic Route Setting,  
SCADA  
Safety SIL4 ETCS (trackside and on-board),  
Interlocking 
Communications SIL0 Fixed Telecommunications Net-
work (FTN),  
Radio (GSM-R) 
Lineside SIL4 Signals, Points, Train Detection  
Table 1.Railway layers 
With conventional signalling systems, the safety layer is implemented 
solely by trackside equipment, but the introduction of in-cab signalling 
and automatic train protection systems such as ERTMS means that the 
safety layer is now partially implemented by on-board equipment. 
Thus, it is important to consider both trackside and on-board equipment 
as part of any risk assessment. 
Fig. 1provides a high-level overview of the architecture of a national 
railway system implemented using ERTMS. The diagram illustrates the 
main interactions between the various layers and system components, 
and the criticality of each layer (SIL0, SIL2, SIL4). Since railway sig-
nalling and control is a socio-technical system, the diagram includes 
people as well as equipment. The main roles considered include the 
controller, the driver, and the system maintainers. 
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Fig. 1.Conceptual architecture of an ERTMS-enabled railway signalling system 
4.3 Scope of assessment 
The focus of the risk assessment was on failures of the railway signal-
ling and control system that could have a major national impact, 
namely: 
• Attacks that result in unsafe train movements, which could cause a 
train accident with considerable loss of life 
• Attacks that result in loss of service, which could lead to major 
transport disruptions 
We chose to exclude attacks that result in the theft of information be-
cause our focus was on the integrity and safety of the rail signalling and 
control system and loss of confidentiality is not a major concern except 
for some very specific attacks (e.g., on high value passengers, hazard-
ous or high value cargoes) and the possible knock-on effect of informa-
tion theft enabling future attacks on the systems.  
Moreover, as this was a security risk assessment, we only considered 
failures resulting from the effect of deliberate attacks. We would expect 
failures resulting from non-malicious causes (like fallen trees, driver 
error, etc.) to be covered by engineering safety assessments.  
4.4 Impact assessment 
We assessed the impact of a successful attack on the railway system 
using a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 was the most serious.  
Our risk assessment identified the capabilities that an attacker would 
need in order to achieve a high impact failure. Attacks were assessed 
with respect to the capability levels shown in Table 2. 
Capability 
level 
Interpretation for railway systems 
E An expert in security engineering who can 
• use tools specific to the domain, which may be cus-
tomised for the attacks 
• develop novel equipment and tools specific to the at-
tack 
• use publicly available and proprietary information on 
how the  
system works and what mitigations are in place 
against attacks  
• develop large test beds and trials for the attack 
• coordinate timing of several attacks 
• influence expert insiders 
Capability 
level 
Interpretation for railway systems 
D An expert in security engineering who can 
• use tools specific to the domain, which may be cus-
tomised for the attacks 
• access to equipment for trials and attack development 
• use publicly available and proprietary information on 
how the  
system works and what mitigations are in place 
against attacks 
• influence knowledgeable insiders 
C Someone with a basic understanding of security engi-
neering who can 
• use tools specific to the domain but without customi-
sation 
• use publicly available information on how the system 
works and what mitigations are in place against at-
tacks  
• influence insiders (but at routine skill level) 
B Someone with physical access to the system, for example 
• an engineer who is able to plug a maintenance console 
into the equipment but has no specific training or au-
thorisation to access the system in this way 
• an unwitting participant, using a compromised ma-
chine or device 
Capability 
level 
Interpretation for railway systems 
A Someone without access to the system, for example 
• unskilled individuals using scripts or programs devel-
oped by others to attack computer systems and net-
works 
• someone who has been co-opted into scaling a distrib-
uted denial of service attack 
• an enterprise IT user 
Table 2. Attack capability levels 
Although our risk assessment was mainly concerned with cyber attacks, 
we also considered the effect of physical attacks on cyber assets be-
cause the infrastructure is geographically distributed and is therefore 
more open to such attacks. We used a similar set of criteria (skills, re-
sources, equipment, etc.) to grade the capability needed for physical 
attacks on cyber equipment.  
Evaluation of the likely attack frequencies and capabilities of specific 
threat sources are outside the assessment scope and would normally be 
undertaken by  
government agencies 
4.5 Risk analysis 
In this section we describe each step of our risk analysis, which consid-
ered possible attack scenarios that could compromise railway assets to 
cause either 
• unsafe movements 
• no movement when it is safe to proceed 
Preliminary fault tree analysis. The initial stage of risk analysis was 
to construct fault trees in order to identify possible attacks on opera-
tional assets that could lead to the top events (unsafe movements and 
no movement). The fault trees systematically considered: 
• attacks on messages sent be-
tween systems, typically by: 
─ blocking transmission 
─ modifying / inserting mes-
sages 
• attacks on the systems them-
selves, typically via compro-
mises of: 
─ system firmware 
─ system configuration data 
The fault trees considered the effect of application-level attacks and 
only dealt with the consequence of these attacks, not their technical 
difficulty or potential impact.  
Attack vectors and capabilities. The next stage of analysis was to 
consider what capabilities (as defined in Table 2) were needed to im-
plement each attack scenario. The scale ranges from A (little skill re-
quired) to E (capabilities usually possessed only by nation states).  
The preliminary risk analysis identified a number of possible attack 
vectors, so  
attack capabilities were estimated for each of these attack vectors. The 
primary attack vectors considered were: 
• physical attacks 
• cyber intrusion 
• data preparation / installation 
• software maintenance 
• network attacks 
The estimated attack capabilities took account of the safety integrity 
level of the system being attacked, because we would expect the vul-
nerabilities and defences to differ between SIL 0 and SIL 4 systems. 
However, because our analysis was based on a generic system architec-
ture for an ERTMS-based system, our estimates of attack capability 
were necessarily quite broad. For a more precise assessment, we would 
need to have detailed knowledge of the actual system. 
Attack scenarios. Using the fault trees and attack capabilities required 
for each attack vector, we developed a series of potential attack scenar-
ios. Each scenario identifies the target asset, the potential attack vec-
tors, and the capability required for the attack. These capability esti-
mates were fairly broad to accommodate uncertainties in the security 
features present in the systems and the maintenance processes. 
We also considered the immediate effect and the potential scale of each 
attack, which we used to inform the impact assessment. 
Impact assessment. Our criticality scale distinguishes between loss of 
service and loss of life, so we make this distinction in our impact 
assessment. 
Loss of life. It is credible that an attack that resulted in “unsafe move-
ment” could cause an accident with 100 or more deaths in the worst 
case. The Eschede [3] and Amagasaki [4] train accidents exceeded this 
level while the Santiago de Compostela [5] accident was just below it. 
One could envisage multiple attacks causing multiple accidents and 
several hundred deaths, but it is likely that rail operators would respond 
to multiple accidents by shutting down the network. 
However, we also need to consider the associated disruption. For a 
physical attack, we estimate that the disruption would be localised to a 
particular part of the network and would last for about a week until the 
physical repairs were completed. In contrast, if the accident was shown 
to be due to a systemic cyber security problem within the safety, com-
munications, or lineside layer, the disruption could be far greater. To 
respond to a systemic cyber problem: 
• All assets of the same type within the rail infrastructure would need 
to be assessed in order to determine if they were vulnerable to the 
same attack. 
• Operational changes would need to be put in place to minimise the 
risk. This would imply degraded service levels for all vulnerable 
parts of the network 
• Systems will need to be updated and validated before normal service 
can be restored 
In the worst-case scenario, the resulting disruption could be nationwide 
and last several weeks.  
Loss of service. There are many attacks that could result in a wide-scale 
loss of  
service, particularly at the business, control and communications layers. 
Cyber attacks on the business and control layers (for example, attacks 
on the timetable or traffic management system) would be a cause for 
concern, but it might be easier to accept systemic vulnerabilities in 
these layers if the attacks could be detected and rapidly corrected (e.g. 
by restoring systems from secure backup storage). Given rapid system 
restoration, a recovery to normal service might take 1 or 2 days.  
However, the impact might be increased by repeat attacks if the vulner-
ability could not easily be addressed.  
Successful physical attacks could also have a widespread effect at the 
business and control layers but again recovery would be fairly rapid (a 
few days) unless there were repeated attacks. 
Loss of service at the safety and lineside levels could be achieved by 
physical attacks but the effect would be localised and physical repairs 
would only take a few days, so the impact would be low. Repetition of 
attacks is possible but the impact would still be fairly low. 
In practice, it is difficult to be too specific about the impact from loss of 
service as this depends on the resilience built into the system architec-
ture. In particular, the impact of a cyber attack depends on the recovery 
process and could be reduced by switching to a fallback mechanism.  
Impact vs. capability summary. We combined the capabilities needed 
for the attacks on specific layers to obtain an overall capability range 
and assigned a worst-case impact based on the rationale outlined in the 
previous section. We then summarized our results graphically, as 
shown in Fig. 2. The lines plot the range of impact and likelihood for 
the different layers, attacks and impacts. The figure illustrates those 
areas with highest impact and lowest capability and shows the scope for 
driving the risks down by reducing the impact or increasing the capabil-
ity. 
 
 Fig. 2. Impact vs. capability diagram 
Further information about the implementation would enable us to de-
velop more precise capability estimates. In addition, our impact as-
sessments could be reduced if the implementation includes features to 
limit the level of disruption if an attack succeeds. 
Although our analysis identified cases where relatively low capability 
attacks could have a high impact, this is partly due to our uncertainty 
about the actual capability needed to perform cyber attacks. 
The capability required for physical attacks is easier to assess and rela-
tively modest capabilities can have quite significant effects. 
For cyber attacks on the network, the capability needed at the commu-
nications layer to cause loss of life depends critically on the protection 
provided at the endpoint subsystems in the safety and lineside layers, 
which in turn depends on whether the network is considered to be open 
or closed. A cyber attack on the connection between the interlocking 
and lineside equipment is currently difficult. However, this may change 
as newer technology (like IP) is introduced. If the communications 
layer is always regarded as untrusted and the endpoints are protected, 
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the capability needed for a successful cyber attack rises from C-E to D-
E. 
The other low capability-high criticality attacks relate to attacks on the 
data used to configure SIL 4 systems in the safety layer. Our capability 
B assessment is at the low end of the capability range and might be 
overly pessimistic. 
5 Cyber security risk assessments of ETCS on-board systems 
As part of the ERTMS upgrade programme, the companies that own 
the trains  
(Rolling Stock Operating Companies or ROSCOs) are in the process of 
tendering for ‘first-in-class’ fitments of ETCS on-board systems for 
each class of locomotive. In the light of concerns about the security of 
ERTMS, Adelard and MWR InfoSecurity were commissioned to pro-
vide advice and guidance on any additional security requirements that 
might need to be included in the contract. Adelard have expertise in 
risk assessment whilst MWR InfoSecurity have expertise in security 
testing.  
Each risk assessment was informed by our generic research into 
ERTMS security issues, the results of a security-focused Hazop work-
shop that was held with the suppliers, subsequent analysis of the system 
by Adelard, and the results of security testing performed by MWR 
InfoSecurity at each supplier’s test facility. 
5.1 Security-informed Hazop methodology 
A series of workshops were held to study the security risks associated 
with each system. The workshops took the form of a security-informed 
Hazard and Operability (Hazop) study, and were attended by experts 
from each supplier.  
A Hazop study is a structured approach to the identification of potential 
hazards and deviations from design and operating intention. The tech-
nique is qualitative, and aims to stimulate the imagination of partici-
pants to identify potential hazards and operability problems. 
The study is based on the architecture of the system and involves a 
multi-disciplinary team of experts. Each element of the system is re-
viewed systematically, using a set of guidewords to prompt the experts 
to identify potential hazards. The experts are asked to identify 
• causes of a potential malfunction 
• potential consequences of the malfunction 
• any system features that can detect or mitigate the malfunction 
• any follow-up activities 
Each study was based on a simplified architecture diagram that was 
intended to capture the most relevant components and interfaces of the 
ETCS on-board system from a cyber security perspective. Adelard cre-
ated this diagram after reviewing the various documents provided by 
the supplier. 
The goal of each Hazop study was to identify potential attacks on the 
ETCS on-board system that could be investigated further during the 
security testing, and to suggest some additional controls and assurance 
activities that would provide confidence that the system was protected 
against such attacks. 
The workshops also provided an opportunity to clarify the system ar-
chitecture and the test environment available for the security testing, 
and identify particular areas of concern to be the focus of the security 
testing. 
The findings of each workshop were systematically recorded as a series 
of Hazop tables, and recommendations were categorised and numbered 
to ensure consistency. Each study resulted in a detailed analysis of pos-
sible attack scenarios, potential hazards, existing protections, and rec-
ommendations for additional security controls. 
5.2 Security testing.  
In this section, we describe our general approach to ERTMS security 
testing and the specific objectives of the security testing that was per-
formed on each supplier’s system by a team of experienced penetration 
testers from MWR InfoSecurity. 
General approach to ERTMS security testing. An ERTMS system 
can be attacked externally via interfaces that are required for ERTMS 
interoperability or internally via interfaces that are proprietary to the 
system. Attacks can be at the application level, network level, or plat-
form level. In particular, the underlying platform might be built using 
COTS components that contain security vulnerabilities or expose addi-
tional services that are not required for the application. 
At the application level, security weaknesses in the ERTMS specifica-
tions allow a variety of attacks that are not described here for obvious 
reasons. 
At the network level, security testing should include robustness testing 
of all the major interfaces, both external and internal, in order to probe 
whether the system is robust against deliberately crafted messages that 
pass the integrity checks but are invalid at the application level.  
Testing should also challenge closed network assumptions. This re-
quires investigating the security of the network used to connect to-
gether components of the ETCS on-board system and assessing the 
damage that could be done to the system by an attacker with access to 
these networks. 
Security testing objectives. The overall goal of the security testing is 
to explore this range of attack vectors and determine whether any of the 
attacks are feasible. In practice, depending on the test environment, it 
may not be possible to perform the full range of tests, so the aim is to 
get broad coverage of the possible attack vectors. 
More specifically, the security testing objectives can be broken down as 
follows: 
• explore the feasibility of attacks allowed by the ERTMS specifica-
tions and discover whether the driver receives any notification if 
something unexpected happens  
• determine whether the ETCS implementation is robust against mal-
formed messages or whether it is possible to crash the system or 
cause it to behave in an arbitrary way 
• investigate whether the closed network assumption is valid and de-
termine what damage could be done by an attacker with access to 
the network and some inside knowledge 
• perform a security audit of the underlying platform and any third-
party components 
Some of the test results exposed anomalies or ambiguities in the 
ERTMS specifications. Although these anomalies do not raise any 
safety or security concerns, it is important to resolve any ambiguities in 
the ERTMS specifications in order to remove the potential for an at-
tacker to exploit differences in behaviour between implementations. 
5.3 Recommendations 
Our final set of recommendations were divided into four categories: 
1. technical or procedural controls that would improve the security of 
the ETCS on-board system 
2. assurance activities to improve confidence in the security of the 
ETCS on-board system 
3. recommendations for national implementation of ERTMS 
4. suggested changes to the ERTMS specifications 
Unfortunately, we cannot publish any of our recommendations here 
because they implicitly identify potential vulnerabilities in the system. 
6 Discussion / lessons learned 
6.1 Context 
There is a growing awareness that safety and security can no longer be 
considered in isolation and that a system cannot be considered to be 
safe unless it has also been shown to be secure. However, there is cur-
rently a lack of underpinning analysis to demonstrate how and whether 
cyber security issues can be integrated in to hazard and risk analyses, 
and hence a lack of consensus about the best way to integrate safety 
and security. In particular, there are no clear guidelines about method-
ology, and standards in this area are still evolving. As a result of the 
work on security-informed safety that Adelard and others have been 
doing in the railway industry, this situation is changing within the UK. 
The Department of Transport has produced a guidance document on 
cyber security for land transport rail systems [6] and commissioned 
work to develop a code of practice for the railway industry on how best 
to develop security-informed safety cases. Adelard has been active in 
this area and worked with the Railway Safety and Standards Board 
(RSSB) to develop a security-informed safety case as an exemplar for 
the railway industry. However, security-informed safety is not just a 
concern for the railway industry – Adelard was a partner in the 
SESAMO project [7], which was concerned with security and safety 
modelling for embedded systems across a wide range of industrial do-
mains, including avionics, automotive, industrial control, medical, 
smart grid as well as rail. There is now a much greater awareness of the 
need to consider cyber security in the design of safety critical systems, 
and the focus has shifted from raising awareness to developing guid-
ance, standards and worked examples. 
6.2 Strategy 
Adopting a phased approach towards cyber security assessment has 
proved to be a very effective strategy. We started by performing a secu-
rity audit of the ERTMS specifications, which enabled us to identify a 
number of systemic vulnerabilities in the specification and potential 
areas of concern. These were refined by developing specific attack sce-
narios, which proved to be a very effective way of communicating and 
engaging with railway stakeholders because the attacks became real 
rather than theoretical and abstract. 
The next stage was to conduct a high-level risk assessment of a national 
implementation of ERTMS, which was used to inform the national risk 
register. Focusing on the potential risks at a national level gave our risk 
assessment a sense of proportionality and perspective. 
In practice, the worst-case impact in terms of loss of life or loss of ser-
vice depends on many implementation factors (including provisions for 
resilience) that are not determined at this stage in the upgrade pro-
gramme, so our assessment will need to be revisited as the upgrade 
progresses and more operational experience is gained, but we believe 
that our main findings are robust.  
Our risk assessment of a national ERTMS implementation was based 
on a generic system architecture with little specific information about 
the vulnerabilities and defences that might exist in the actual system. In 
contrast, our risk assessment of ETCS on-board systems from each of 
the major suppliers looked at real systems in detail and took into ac-
count the results of security testing and vulnerabilities discovered in the 
configuration of each system. These assessments were performed on 
behalf of the rolling stock operating companies (ROSCOs), who 
wished to purchase ETCS  
on-board systems for new and existing trains and needed to have some 
reassurance that their assets would be robust against cyber security at-
tack. The results of the assessments were used to inform the procure-
ment process for the ‘first-in-class’ fitment programme to install ETCS 
on each class of locomotive, and the recommendations from each as-
sessment were written into the contract with each supplier. The assess-
ments were beneficial to both the purchasers and the suppliers because 
they enabled the purchasers to reduce their risk whilst providing guid-
ance to the suppliers on how to improve the security of their products.  
6.3 Where next? 
Over the last few years, government and industry have been mobilizing 
and commissioning research and support for developing cyber security 
strategies and guidance and there is now a plethora of groups working 
in this area. It is important to develop a coherent strategy that clearly 
identifies roles and responsibilities at different levels of governance 
(project, industry, government) and identifies gaps where further re-
search and development of standards and guidance is necessary. 
Railway-specific issues. In the railway context, management of cyber 
risk is complicated by the divided responsibilities for maintaining 
safety in an ERTMS-based signalling system. Responsibility for the 
safety layer is split between the trackside and the train, which are 
owned and managed by different organisations. Security needs to be 
embedded in the processes used by all stakeholders in order to maintain 
the overall safety and integrity of the signalling system.  
Another complicating factor is the widespread use of legacy systems 
that were designed in a different age to protect against different threats. 
Closed network assumptions are no longer valid but it is not always 
possible to add security features to legacy systems, so alternative ap-
proaches are needed.  
At a more general level, we need to consider if there is adequate over-
sight for the introduction and operation of new technology like ERTMS 
and whether there are sufficient technical resources available to the 
regulator. 
Incident reporting. It is important to ensure that we can learn from 
incidents, so that safety issues with the new technology can be identi-
fied and rectified. Ideally, incident reporting should be undertaken by 
all ERTMS users and suppliers. We recommend the introduction of 
policies for the collection, analysis and sharing of cyber incident infor-
mation, even when such incidents have no safety impact. 
Resilience requirements. There is currently a lack of any clear defini-
tion of resilience requirements from a policy perspective. While safety 
is governed by existing legislation, there do not appear to be any sys-
tem level resilience requirements. Governance and business models 
should be established to ensure that sufficient resilience is provided by 
the system as a whole. Incentives may need to be provided for diversity 
that is justified from wider societal consideration rather than from an 
infrastructure owner’s business case. 
Secure by design. There is also clearly a need for industry guidance on 
methodology and guidance for developing and assessing systems that 
are intended to be both safe and secure. Suppliers need guidance on 
how to build security into their products, and purchasers need to be in-
formed about cyber security and be given tools to help them assess 
whether a product is adequately secure for its intended use. This is par-
ticularly important during the procurement phase of a large railway pro-
ject, where there is an opportunity to influence both the generic product 
and a specific application of the product to the GB context. 
There are already a number of sources of guidance available, including: 
• 20 critical controls 
• DHS cyber security procurement language 
• Trustworthy software initiative 
• Cyber essentials 
• Guidance on secure application development from organisations such 
as BSIMM, OWASP, Microsoft, SafeCode. 
• Common Criteria 
These need to be customized and adapted for the railway sector. 
Standards and legislation. In Europe, any significant changes to a 
mainline railway system must be assessed in accordance with the 
Common Safety Method. This is a legal requirement. Similarly, the 
ERTMS specifications form part of the Technical Specification for In-
teroperability, which is mandated by European law. This makes it diffi-
cult for GB concerns about cyber security within the railway industry to 
be addressed at a national level, and makes it necessary to engage at a 
European level to influence the development of these standards to en-
sure that they include adequate provision and protection against cyber 
attacks.  
Risk and uncertainty. A risk assessment should be a living document 
and needs to be re-visited periodically during the system life cycle. 
Risks can change during the development of the system and also during 
its operation, so it is important to understand the risks and the mitiga-
tions in place at every stage of the life cycle. This is particularly true 
for risks arising from cyber security threats – security decays faster 
than safety. 
Our risk assessments of ETCS on-board systems were assessments of 
mature systems and were performed with the benefit of detailed design 
documents, access to system experts, and the opportunity to perform 
security testing on the actual system to determine whether potential 
vulnerabilities existed in reality and could be exploited. The systems 
were still under development but the manufacturers were receptive to 
our recommendations and willing to incorporate changes into the de-
sign of their systems to make them more robust and resilient against 
cyber attack.  
In contrast, our risk assessment of a national ERTMS implementation 
was performed at an early stage in the upgrade programme, and was 
therefore based on a generic system architecture. As a result, there is 
significant uncertainty in the results and it is therefore important to re-
visit the assessment as more implementation detail is provided and 
more operational experience is gained. An updated risk assessment 
would need to address 
• the impact of the differing responsibilities of the multiple stake-
holders (operators, leasing companies and the supply chain) for 
safety management and hence cyber risk 
• the susceptibility of data preparation and maintenance processes to 
cyber attack 
• the extent to which the overall system architecture is designed to 
limit cyber attack as the system evolves (e.g. when there are changes 
in network technology) 
• the resilience and recovery from cyber attack provided by fall-back 
options (both in fixed infrastructure and on board the train) 
• the co-operation and security culture of the stakeholders 
7 Conclusions 
The next generation of railway signalling and control systems will po-
tentially have more risk and less resilience than the current generation 
of systems due to security vulnerabilities and increased connectivity. 
However, this increased connectively means that the new systems could 
potentially be engineered with stronger controls, greater defence in 
depth, and improved recovery mechanisms, thus eventually presenting 
less risk overall and provide greater. The risk assessments presented in 
this paper are one contribution to ensuring that this is the case. 
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